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ABSTRACT
During the last ten years, rural Afghanistan has received
more humanitarian assistance involving more international
assistance agencies than any other war-affected region in
the developing world. This cross-border assistance, which is
typically administered by U.S. and European non-governmental
organizations based in Pakistan, has been been used to
support rehabilitation projects in the rural areas despite
the ongoing war.
This paper examines the program approaches adopted by two
of the most significant international agencies sponsoring
agricultural rehabilitation inside Afghanistan. The basic
objectives of these agencies, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are
different. However, both support projects through the same
mechanisms--the various non-governmental organizations
operating inside Afghanistan--and experience the same
constraints in these operations, which provide limited
access and information to project planners. As a result, by
working through the same kinds of implementing agencies and
under the same conditions, the impact of these different
programs in rural Afghanistan may be very much the same.
This paper considers the similarities and differences
between these two agencies in their cross-border programs.
This paper concludes that rehabilitation supported by both
agencies may create local conflicts and ultimately
complicate the postwar rehabilitation process.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN
During the past ten years, rural Afghanistan has received
more humanitarian assistance through more international
relief agencies than any other war-affected region in the
world. This assistance represents both the humanitarian
impulse and degree of political support that has emerged in
response to the Afghanistan conflict. The plight of the
Afghans--since 1979, engaged in a bitter war against a
fledgling communist government--has inspired significant
support by European and American donors alike, including one
bilateral agency, U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).
Afghanistan represents an unusual case among war-affected
areas not only because of the amount of international
assistance it has received, but because this assistance
provides more than simply emergency relief to this war-torn
country. Throughout the war, donor funds have also supported
a considerable number of developmental activities in the
rural areas. In this way, international agencies have been
regularly supporting rehabilitation efforts during the
course of war. The reasons behind the success or failure of
these efforts may provide important lessons in the future
for planners of postwar reconstruction. By considering the
different approaches of international agencies supporting
rehabilitation inside Afghanistan, this study examines the
implications and effectiveness of projects of this kind.
The rehabilitation activities underway in Afghanistan are
unprecedented in scope. Supported largely by grants from
USAID and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
have been planning and administering small-scale
agricultural rehabilitation projects in various districts
throughout rural Afghanistan. This study specifically
examines the kinds of projects funded by USAID and UNHCR,
the operational constraints they have faced, and how these
efforts--which tend to favor areas with relatively strong
political organizations--may produce conflict between
project areas and the state following the resolution of war.
In the case of Afghanistan, two different sets of
objectives underlie these rehabilitation efforts. By helping
to restore the production potential of the rural areas,
international donors hope to facilitate the eventual return
of the massive Afghan refugee population. This means working
with Afghans who have remained in Afghanistan to increase
the food-producing capacity of areas to which refugees are
expected to return. At the same time, donors support the
provision of production and rehabilitation assistance to
rural Afghanistan as a means of supporting the cause of the
mulaheddin resistance. By supplying essential agricultural
inputs to the rural areas, donors intend to strengthen the
production potential of this population in its struggle
against the Soviet-backed government.
The program approach of USAID and UNHCR, respectively,
represent these two different objectives. By providing
humanitarian assistance to the rural areas, USAID supports
the struggle of the resistance against the Soviet-backed
communist regime and to promote stability in anticipation of
success by the mujaheddin in its war. Rather than provide
comprehensive rehabilitation assistance to rural
Afghanistan, UNHCR, by contrast, provides emergency
assistance to the areas to which most Afghan refugees
specifically are expected to return.
Although these two agencies vary greatly in terms of
their objectives, in certain respects the implications of
their programs are very much the same. In the case of
Afghanistan, USAID and UNHCR support rehabilitation
projects, which are planned and implemented without a
recognized government, in much the same way as they support
projects which require the cooperation of the government
through which they occur. By strengthening project areas in
the absence of government, rehabilitation assistance efforts
may strengthen the bases of political support of local
leaders and establish areas likely to be hostile to
government following the resolution of war.
In the absence of government, both USAID and UNHCR rely
heavily upon the implementing capacity of NGOs inside
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, this means that the programs of
these two agencies are carried out by a diverse group of
implementors, many of which individually depend upon
political alliances to implement their activities. In this
setting, each NGO assumes a quasi-governmental role,
strengthening the project area in which it operates. In so
doing, each NGO creates areas that may be disinclined to
recognize the authority of an official government structure
after the resolution of war. By working through NGOs with
similar approaches and typically limited field experience,
both agencies support projects that employ similar means
while intending to arrive at different goals.
The role of NGOs in rehabilitation projects differs from
the role of NGOs in other development efforts. While
administering projects that channel assistance into
Afghanistan, NGOs operate with incomplete information,
depend largely upon local political alliances, and rely upon
Afghan monitors with scant background in monitoring and
evaluation to report on the progress of project sites. This
report shows how the program approaches of USAID and UNHCR
result in the strengthening of project areas about which
only a limited amount can be known.
The following report considers how much room there is for
international agencies to maneuver in situations of this
kind. Judging from the Afghanistan case, it is clear that
USAID and UNHCR have few options when designing and
implementing rehabilitation projects. During war, agencies
operate under conditions in which political alliances,
irregular access to project sites, and severely limited
information together shape these projects. It may in fact be
impossible to avoid creating potential conflicts by
supporting project areas. By examining the experiences of
USAID and UNHCR in Afghanistan, however, it is possible to
consider what kind of options exist for agencies operating
in a country engaged in conflict.
CHAPTER ONE:
HOW THE WAR HAS AFFECTED RURAL AFGHANISTAN
This section provides a brief outline of the factors that
led to war in Afghanistan and the subsequent exodus of a
large number of its people to neighboring Pakistan and Iran,
where they currently live as refugees. This will help to
explain how rural Afghanistan has been affected and, in some
cases, transformed by the war. With this information, it may
be possible to draw some conclusions about how international
assistance itself can influence the changes that occur in
rural areas during times of war and political conflict.
In the late 1970s, Afghanistan became engaged in a war
that has since triggered the flight of some six million
refugees from the countryside (USCR 1990). Additionally, it
is estimated that nearly two million individuals have been
internally displaced within country. Throughout the war,
most of the internally displaced have migrated to
Afghanistan's urban areas, causing some centers--like the
capital, Kabul--to reportedly triple in size (English 1989:
17). The absence of this massive population--perhaps one-
third of the total prewar population--has disrupted
agricultural production, altered traditional forms of
leadership, and facilitated the excercise of local political
control by members of the muiaheddin resistance throughout
the rural areas.
The war that produced this extraordinary number of
refugees was, initially, a counter-revolution. Immediately
following the 1978 coup carried out by the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Afghanistan's
fledgling communist government initiated a radical program
of reforms that targeted the traditional and fiercely
independent rural population. This program included land
reform, cancellation of most peasant debt, and abolition of
the traditional brideprice--itself a significant source of
debt among rural Afghans.
In response to attempts by the government to implement
these reforms, rural groups throughout Afghanistan began an
armed rebellion against the regime and its representatives
in the countryside. The inability of the government to
suppress the revolts led to direct Soviet intervention in
1979. By the end of 1982, some three million Afghans had
registered as refugees in Pakistan alone, having fled the
violence and destruction that had completely destabilized
the rural areas.
The Afghanistan case is an anomoly in this century of
peasant revolution. In Afghanistan, small landholders and
landless farmers, the intended beneficiaries of reform,
joined large property owners in revolting against outside
attempts to redistribute wealth, to improve the productive
capacity of individual holdings, and, above all, to force
the change of traditional practices in the rural areas
(Gibbs 1986: 36). For many observers, this reveals an
intriguing aspect of rural Afghan society: although,
according to Afghanistan's 1967 agricultural survey, an
estimated twenty percent of Afghan landholders owned nearly
seventy-five percent of the rural holdings (IBRD 1978),
large landholders were not the instigators and leaders of
this counter-revolution.
In fact, landlords were rarely the ones to call for
revolt. This decision was usually made by local clergy or
the village representative, called the malik. Afghan
observers have noted that landlords, in fact, did not
initially regard the new government as communist. Until the
agrarian reform was actually implemented, many believed that
they would continue to work cooperatively with the regime,
when necessary (Roy 1986: 150-152). Consequently, the
peasant population appears to have been more actively
involved than the large landholders in this rebellion.
During the course of the war, the influence of large
landholders has been replaced by the influence of political
and religious leaders, who play a far greater role in the
resistance. At the same time, less influential individuals
have also gained power they did not have prior to the war.
Smallholders, for example, have acquired arms and
considerable political clout as a result of their
participation in the resistance (Roy 1986: 165).
Additionally, local commanders, appointed by resistance
parties, have assumed significant responsibility for both
strategic planning and civil administration in the areas
they currently control.
Despite such power shifts, rural Afghans have been
influenced by the war in one very noticeable respect: both
refugees and those remaining in the countryside have become
more rigorous in their adherence to traditional Islamic
practices. The defense of Islam against state encroachment
defined the Afghan resistance. As a result, traditional
Islamic structures and practices have assumed greater
importance in rural Afghanistan during the war. This is
exemplified by the strict adoption during the war of
shari'at law, which is administered locally by religious
scholars, members of the 'ulama. Despite changes in local
leadership, the war appears to have heightened the wariness
of rural Afghans to outside influence, increased rural
cohesiveness, and tightened resistance against any attempt
to alter the practice of local Islamic traditions.
As a result of the war, local influence in Afghanistan is
no longer determined by the economic power that a single
individual--the large landlord or khan--wields within the
community. Instead, in the current social order a complex
network of military, party and religious leaders control the
rural areas at both the district and provincial level. In
parts of the north, reportedly it is not uncommon for the
sons of local khans to become local commanders within the
resistance. In most areas, however, the khan and his
relations are considered ill-suited to the task of
organizing within the party structure (Roy 1986: 151). The
khan's influence is largely secular and individualistic,
determined by patronage. For these reasons, muiaheddin
leaders have generally made an effort to exclude local
landlords from participating in the resistance movement
(Roy 1986: 150-152).
Although the influence of the khan has diminished during
the past decade, an examination of this critical role
reveals much about the traditional structure of rural
society. The khan is not a feudal lord nor are members of
his community vassals. Instead, the power of the khan stems
from his ability to maintain equilibrium while dispensing
favors, mediating disputes and looking after the
communities' most vulnerable members. The community--
10
typically the patrilineal gawm--invests the khan with his
power and permits him to excercise authority in local
decision-making.
In response to the war, rural communities have shifted
their support away from the khan and assigned the right to
govern to political and religious leaders associated with
the local resistance (Roy 1986: 150-152). Whether former
khans will fully regain their authority after the war
remains unclear. In the meantime, rural communities have
established a parallel structure of local decision-making
and control, which is entirely determined by political and
religious leaders whose authority is similarly sanctioned by
the population that remains.
Although Afghan observers maintain that local traditions
will most likely remain unchanged by the war, individual
power shifts have occurred throughout rural Afghanistan that
will determine how--and to whom--local power is transferred
during the postwar period. In some cases, khans will
probably be permanently displaced by leaders who emerged
during the resistance. This is most likely to occur in areas
where public opinion holds that specific landlords failed to
adequately support the Islamic resistance and the local
muiaheddin. Many believe, however, that khans will likely
regain their past influence, particularly in areas where
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war-affected communities have remained cohesive despite the
war.
To some Afghan observers, it appears that landlords who
abandoned their land and failed to participate in local
resistance may have difficulties reclaiming their holdings
after the war. Indeed, many large landholders left the
country without contributing to resistance efforts.
Officials from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) note that during the early years of the war
large landholders comprised a significant presence among
newly-arrived refugees (Gabaudan 1989; Ice 1989).
Olivier Roy points out that in the tribal areas, where
the rivalry between khan and 'ulama is particularly acute,
the most influential landlords appear to have left the
country altogether--some after attempting to organize the
resistance within their tribe (Roy 1986: 150-152). In these
areas, the landlords who have chosen to remain are the
equivalent of small landed gentry; the great families have
generally gone.
During the postwar period, property disputes are also
likely to occur in areas that have maintained a labor
surplus during the war. In many cases, abandonned lands have
been cultivated despite the absence of landowners. In fact,
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there are reports that scouts reclaiming land rights on
behalf of refugee landlords have been met by local farmers
demanding payment for their labor--compensation for having
cultivated land that would have otherwise become fallow. In
some cases, local farmers have demanded payment expressly in
the form of a share of the landlord's former holding
(Gabaudan 1989).
In other cases, land ownership may be jeopardized for
purely political reasons. According to Afghan observers, it
is possible that some landlords will face retribution for
not having participated in the resistance. Based upon
reports from the field, there are indications that, in such
cases, the local party may withhold some portion of land
belonging to landholders specifically considered to have
abandonned the resistance (Etienne 1990). This is likely to
occur in areas where the resistance has broken traditional
bonds, thus weakening local loyalties towards the previous
authorities. During the course of the war, many commanders
have drawn supporters from different tribes, clans and
sometimes even ethnic groups, thereby cross-cutting
loyalties which help to weaken traditional ties (Carter &
Connor: 15).
According to recent reports, political parties are
controlling abandonned land in a way that may impact local
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production practices after the war. Recent missions into
Kunar Province by a team representing the United Nations
Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) found it
was common for local resistance leaders to arrange to
cultivate land belonging to their followers in Pakistan
(UNOCA 1989c: 9). In such cases, the party typically retains
half the crop. Under these circumstances, UNOCA noted a food
surplus; according to the mission, food produced on
abandoned land is subsequently sold to political parties.
Indeed, in some respects the flight of refugees from the
countryside has actually benefitted the rural areas. Prior
to the war, population increases were leading to an overall
land shortage (Roy 1986: 171)--a considerable concern in
rural Afghanistan, where estimates hold that only eight
percent of the total land area is arable (IBRD 1978). The
absence of such a large proportion of the rural population
has greatly reduced population pressure on land production.
Lack of inputs, significant loss of farm power, and the
destruction of irrigation and storage facilities, however,
continue to pose a considerable production constraint.
In some parts of Afghanistan, entire communities have
been abandonned. Smaller tribes have often fled collectively
to neighboring countries, thus abandonning all land
belonging to its members. This phenomenon, considered a
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"protest exodus," is a passive form of protest against the
occupation of Muslim territory by infidels. Although most
rural Afghans defend Islam through armed struggle, the Koran
also permits protest through flight (Roy 1985: 165). The
protest exodus is typically organized by the most
influential local families and involves all community
members.
This type of flight enables a group to resettle together
and maintain its cohesion while living abroad as refugees.
Although it is not known whether tribal villages have been
occupied by other internally displaced groups, it seems that
at least within the organized parties of the resistance
leaders respect property rights in accordance with shari'at
law.
Relatively more is known about land transfer practices
among the ethnic Pashtun, who dominate the seven provinces
directly across the Pakistan border. Pashtun landholders
typically leave their holdings in the hands of a relative.
Initially, those who left tended to abandon their holdings
in response to the threat of land reform and redistribution;
as the war progressed, flight became a response to violence
and the drastically decreased production resulting from war
(Gabaudan 1989). Those who flee, however, typically maintain
close links with their villages.
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The border betwen Afghanistan and Pakistan is extremely
porous, permitting relatively free travel access for
refugees wishing to check on the state of their village,
their land and their home. Pashtun and other refugee groups
who originate from areas inside the border appear to be
taking full advantage of this access. Since the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, UNHCR refugee camp
monitors note that refugees have been sending family members
across the border to assess damage to homes and lands and,
in some cases, to attempt to resume cultivation (Gabaudan
1989).
In cases where refugees have some access to their
homeland, it seems that the connections between refugees and
their villages have been largely unaffected by absence due
to war. Because refugees are able to assert their right to
ownership, land disputes are less likely to occur in these
areas. In areas where access is possible, there is typically
regular communication between villages and the refugee
camps, thus ensuring that bonds remain strong.
There are indications that, in some areas, the war has
created an active land market. This has been most noticeable
among the Pashtun, who are renowned for their trading skills
and entrepreneurial savvy. This group, which comprises some
16
62% of the Afghan refugee population in Pakistan, is less
constrained by communal ties than other tribal groups.
Pashtun typically flee as families rather than as larger,
communal units. When Pashtuns arrive in their place of
exile, the larger social groups of which they are part do
not re-form. Consequently, this type of exodus has tended to
break down social bonds (Roy 1986: 166). The refugee
experience, it seems, has accelerated the potential for
socio-economic change among the Pashtun.
Indeed, Pashtun appear to be profiting from other, less
fortunate members. According to reports from within the
refugee camps, land speculators among the Pashtun purchased
small holdings from destitute refugees at throwaway prices
throughout the war (Gabaudan 1989). Most Afghan observers
believe that, in accordance with traditional practice, any
kind of land title transfer will be honored after the war.
.These are some of the more visible developments observed
by outsiders assessing the impact of the war upon rural
Afghanistan. Chapter two will examine how international
agencies that provide agricultural rehabilitation assistance
to Afghanistan have been operating within this environment.
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CHAPTER TWO:
WHAT THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
HAS BEEN DOING
The war in Afghanistan has inspired international donors
to channel substantial amounts of aid to rural Afghans
through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in
Pakistan. Although initially directed towards relief
operations within Pakistan's Afghan refugee camps,
international aid currently supports efforts to
significantly strengthen the agriculture sector in rural
Afghanistan, which remains outside of government control.
There are as many different approaches to rehabilitation as
there are NGOs: by September 1989 a total of sixty-four
international NGOs belonged to one of two NGO coordinating
organizations active along the border of Pakistan. It is
estimated that at least one hundred international NGOs
operate among war-affected Afghans.
This section will focus upon the work of NGOs funded by
the two largest supporters of cross-border agricultural
rehabilitation in Afghanistan: a bilateral agency, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and a
multilateral agency, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). This section examines the agricultural
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rehabilitation programs designed for Afghanistan by USAID
and UNHCR and considers the extent to which these
rehabilitation efforts were determined by the conditions in
which they operate.
In this section, discussion will be limited to projects
supported from the mid-1980s, when USAID began supporting
projects in Afghanistan, through the summer of 1989, several
months following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. By
this point in 1989, it became clear to observers that the
war had become a protracted conflict between Afghans and
subsequently would not result, as expected, in a large-scale
return of Afghan refugees to their homeland. This analysis
reflects the way in which USAID and UNHCR responded through
their rehabilitation programs to this most recent
development in Afghanistan's war.
The U.S. Government continues to provide the only
bilateral support to rural Afghanistan. Begun in the spring
of 1985, U.S. cross-border assistance initially involved $8
million in grants supporting the health, education and cash-
for-food activities of several European NGOs already
operating in Afghanistan. At that time, NGOs were largely
providing relief rather than rehabilitation assistance to
groups inside Afghhanistan. Providing humanitarian
assistance through these groups provided the U.S. Government
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an opportunity to support rural Afghans in their struggle
against the Soviet-backed communist regime.
In the first year of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan,
funds were provided out of the Washington-based Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). Because European NGOs
operating in Afghanistan were unwilling to accept direct
U.S. support for their activities, these funds were
channeled through two U.S. NGOs, International Rescue
Committee (IRC) and Americares Foundation. This early
conflict represents an ambivalence that remains among
experienced NGOs operating in Afghanistan through the
support of the USAID rehabilitation program.
In 1986, Congress expanded this program, authorizing the
creation of a five-year cross-border humanitarian assistance
program called the PVO Co-Financing Project. Administered by
the Office of the AID Representative (AID/REP) staff in the
U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, this project supported
primarily the health-related activities of selected NGOs,
especially medical training for Afghans, including members
of the mujaheddin. Several agricultural and educational
programs were supported through this project. During this
period, IRC and Americares continued to function as
intermediaries for the NGOs funded through this program.
Although this arrangement is unusual among USAID-funded
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programs, it illustrates the difficulties faced by USAID as
it has attempted to support rehabilitation in Afghanistan:
its program has been determined by the practices established
by NGOS operating in Afghanistan.
During the first year of AID/REP activities, financial
assistance was also provided to support a cash-for-food
program inside Afghanistan. This kind of program involves
the direct transport of cash to targeted areas reported to
require emergency food assistance. NGOs receiving cash-for-
food grants through USAID typically employ Afghan
staffmembers to travel to project areas in order to
distribute local currency among local residents. Local
leaders usually play an important role in these efforts,
publicizing the program, assembling the population, and
communicating to agency representatives the extent of the
need. Cash provides a kind of relief assistance, intended to
help war-affected populations achieve self-sufficiency
following crisis. Cash-for-food assistance provides
international agencies a means to encourage Afghans to
remain in their communities rather than to become refugees.
In 1987, Congress increased the budget of the five-year
PVO Co-Financing Project to $35 million. In an effort to
move away from the provision of cash relief grants, AID/REP
21
proposed the creation of the Rural Assistance Project (RAP),
to be funded separately from the health-oriented activities
supported through PVO Co-Financing. RAP was expressly
designed to assist war-affected Afghans who wish to remain
in their homes. RAP grants supported activities aimed at
increasing agricultural productivity and facilitating the
provision of food in rural Afghanistan. By providing
essential production assistance, RAP grants were intended to
help prevent the kind of crisis that produces refugees in
when war constraints local capacity for production..
In 1988, USAID signed a two-year cooperative agreement
with IRC for $9.4 million. This agreement outlined four
specific types of grants to be funded through RAP: survival
grants, which provide cash-for-food in areas where the
transport of food is especially difficult; emergency
assistance, which provides relief to areas impacted by war
offensives or natural disaster; and village assistance,
which supports local rehabilitation efforts and provides
agricultural inputs to secure, potentially productive areas.
Resettlement grants, which aim to help returning populations
resume agricultural production, were also established,
although by the end of 1989 no resettlement projects had yet
been funded.
Within six months of the agreement, $7.9 million in
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subgrants had been made to eight NGOs, including four U.S.-
based agencies, to support projects in thirteen provinces
within Afghanistan. The availability of funds clearly
resulted in the design of a wide number of NGO projects.
Given the number of provinces targeted for rehabilitation
projects, it appears that USAID intended to achieve impact
throughout Afghanistan. The greater the number--and spread--
of sponsored projects, however, the more difficult it
becomes for international agencies to control the
implementation and monitoring of these efforts. The extreme
growth during this period of NGO activities indicates that
impact was a greater priority for USAID than viability.
During the same 1987-88 period, AID/REP allocated $13.6
million to support activities funded through the PVO Co-
Financing Project. All but one of these grants supported
health care activities. In a shift within the project,
nearly three-quarters of the grants supported the work of
U.S.-based NGOs specializing in health care; the remaining
funds continued supporting the health care activities of
three of the European NGOs originally financed through this
project. In 1989, the PVO Co-Financing Project changed focus
entirely, providing medical training and preventative lealth
care for Afghans rather than emergency medical services.
Funds allocated for PVO Co-Financing were reduced to
$900,000 during this period. This reflected a major shift
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within the USAID program away from emergency relief
assistance in order to support forms of rehabilitation.
The cross-border humanitarian assistance program in
Afghanistan is an unusual undertaking for USAID. The role of
NGOs in this program is particularly unique--and, to some,
unsettling. USAID normally designs an assistance program in
conjunction with the host government and employs a
contractor to oversee implementation. When an NGO receives a
USAID contract, neither USAID nor the host government may
participate in or control implementation. In fact, only
after its completion can USAID take action against a project
it funds: if the performance has not been satisfactory, then
the contract may not be renewed. In the Afghanistan case,
the application of this contractual approach to
rehabilitation enables each USAID-sponsored NGOs to operate
independently--unrestrained by the funding agency for the
duration of the contract. In this way, each NGO influences
its project area independently from the others representing
USAID throughout Afghanistan.
NGO projects planned for Afghanistan involve areas that
cannot be visited by USAID staff. Throughout the war, the
U.S. government has officially restricted the travel of U.S.
citizens to Afghanistan. USAID staff and U.S. citizens
working for NGOs funded by the U.S. are therefore prohibited
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from entering Afghanistan. As a result, NGOs design their
projects based upon their experience in areas in which they
have established contacts; due to the travel restrictions,
implementation is typically carried out by Afghan field
staff and project evaluation undertaken by Afghan monitors.
Under these conditions, USAID is necessarily excluded
from both project design and evaluation. The agency bases
its NGO funding decisions entirely upon the perceived
strength of the project, the reliability of the NGO, and the
reported operational capacity of its Afghan staff. Because
cross-border projects are largely inaccessible, NGOs
initiating these projects become responsible both for
designing and evaluating their own projects. In a cross-
border operation, there is no standard criteria for project
evaluation; USAID itself rarely requires funded projects to
meet any particular objectives. Consequently, NGOs gauge
success based upon the extent to which their project
achieves its original objectives.
The Afghanistan program is also unique for USAID
because the government recognized by the U.S. is not
involved in the NGO project cycle. This has been a source of
concern within USAID and among Afghan observers. Although
the support of the Afghan Interim Government (AIG) remains a
major U.S. policy objective, NGO funds channeled into
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Afghanistan neither support nor involve the Peshawar-based
AIG, comprised of members of the seven major political
parties within the resistance. NGOs, in fact, tend to bypass
the AIG entirely in their operations: some consider the AIG
incapable of coordinating rehabilitation activities, while
others do not believe that the AIG legitimately represents
the Afghan people.
In the case of Afghanistan, USAID has taken no steps to
require that NGOs cooperate with the AIG, despite the fact
that this would reflect standard USAID practice. Instead,
USAID has permitted NGOs to define the program. By deviating
from its standard pracfice while deferring to agencies
operating in Afghanistan, USAID further politicizes a highly
charged program.
USAID deviates from its standard practice because these
NGO projects do not contribute to the capacity of rural
Afghanistan to administer projects in the future. USAID
typically acts to strengthen the local institutional
capacity of an assisted region by working closely with the
host government. Because USAID works directly with NGOs
rather than through an official government channel, this
cross-border project approach does not permit the kind of
institution-building that the agency has traditionally
sought to uphold. Unlike most USAID-funded activities, these
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NGO operations do not strengthen the capacity of the
assisted government to assume responsibility for the
project. Instead, NGOs control the design and implementation
of its projects on behalf of local beneficiaries. In this
way, NGOs strengthen local groups in target areas rather
than building an institutional structure to facilitate local
administration in the future.
In separate projects, USAID initially attempted to
involve the AIG more directly in its efforts to develop
several sectors in rural Afghanistan: agriculture, health
and education. These sector support projects do not rely
upon the various NGOs operating inside Afghanistan. Instead,
individual implementing agencies based in Peshawar
administer each project through cross-border operations. In
terms of scale, level of funding and potential impact, the
sector support projects are more significant than USAID's
NGO projects. Unlike the NGO projects funded through RAP and
PVO Co-Financing, AID/REP also designs these projects and
directly controls implementation through the individual
contracting agencies assigned to these projects.
AID/REP has contracted with individual agencies to
administer each project from field offices in Peshawar. Two
of these--Management Sciences for Health, the contractor for
the Health Sector Support Project, and University of
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Nebraska-Omaha, the contractor for the Education Sector
Support Project--implemented projects in Afghanistan prior
to the war. Begun in 1987, the three sector support projects
were designed to be absorbed by a government representing
the Afghan resistance. These projects were designed based
upon the assumption that the resistance movement would
eventually govern Afghanistan. By operating on this
assumption, USAID risks establishing and supporting sectors
that may actually be transferred to the Kabul government
upon the resolution of war. This scenario would force USAID
to either continue supporting these project to some degree
or to end its support, despite the resolution of conflict.
Neither situation would reflect well on this U.S. agency.
The Agriculture Sector Support Project (ASSP) began in
1987 with Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA) in
charge of implementation. VITA, an agency based outside of
Washington, is known by agriculturalists worldwide for its
extensive technical assistance information network. When
VITA began operating ASSP, the purpose was twofold: to
provide resources intended to support agricultural
rehabilitation and increased agricultural productivity as
well as to support the growth over time of institutional
mechanisms capable of utilizing the resources provided
through this project. Whereas USAID's NGO project sidesteps
the AIG entirely, this approach presupposes the existence of
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an entirely functional government.
In an attempt to work effectively within the Afghanistan
context, AID/REP designed ASSP in the form of two distinct
tracks. Working with the seven-party Alliance, AID/REP
initially planned to help establish a quasi-governmental
body to oversee these agricultural rehabilitation efforts.
In what was termed Track I of the project, AID/REP
anticipated supporting a group of Afghan technocrats,
nominated by the alliance parties, to implement this USAID-
supported program.
This plan required the creation of a policy-making
Agricultural Council from within the party structure. Within
a year, AID/REP abandoned Track I because this organization
never became fully functional within the party. The reasons
for this failure are not outlined in general project
documents. Subsequently, USAID did not attempt to include
the AIG in other aspects of project planning, except to
regularly inform the AIG of its activities. Instead, ASSP
began supporting rehabilitation
on a regional level--and local groups for this purpose.
Under a separate project component, AID/Rep also
attempted to provide resources to rural Afghanistan by means
of the private sector and NGOs. For this part of ASSP, VITA
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was enlisted to oversee these early efforts, which were
considered Track II. When Track I was abandoned, VITA
engaged the former Director of the Department of Rural Works
in Afghanistan in its operations. VITA established a rural
works program similar to the one that existed prior to the
war.
Based upon this prewar model, VITA established specific
area development schemes within Afghanistan. These
regionally-based projects involved the rehabilitation of
local irrigation infrastructure and roads as well as the
cleaning of traditional irrigation canals, called karez, in
targeted areas. The project planners anticipated that
essential inputs like fertilizer, seed, and oxen would also
be eventually directed to these areas.
VITA consequently became an early supporter of regional
development inside Afghanistan. By late 1988 there were
twelve area development schemes supported in eight
provinces. In addition to basic inputs, the project areas
received tractors, threshers, reapers, bullocks and improved
seed varieties. Based on the apparent success of this
approach, AID/Rep believed that the area development scheme
concept could eventually provide an institutional means
through which to channel resources to Afganistan. In this
way, VITA's project staff filled a role previously intended
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for the Alliance's Agricultural Council and its technical
representatives.
To carry out its projects, VITA employed a largely Afghan
staff, the majority of whom worked inside Afghanistan. Each
area development scheme was assigned an area development
officer responsible for identifying projects and
coordinating assistance. Local Afghan monitors also worked
within the area to evaluate the progress of supported
projects. Afghans also handled complex transportation and
distribution arrangements, which draw heavily upon the
operational capacity of private-sector cross-border
activities. These regionally-based projects thus engage both
local leaders and entrepreneurs who have emerged during the
war. In this way, these projects support those who have
assumed or maintained influence during the conflict.
To guarantee effectiveness, AID/REP restricted its
agricultural projects to areas that were secure, accessible
to Peshawar, and in which local commanders were willing to
cooperate with staff presence and project goals. In
addition, VITA required that the area contain a traditional
local council, or shura, to legitimize project activities,
to facilitate communication, and to handle local
distribution of all resources provided through the project.
Although international agencies consider these councils to
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provide the only local institutional capacity to administer
rehabilitation assistance, shuras traditionally mediate
local disputes rather than local resource allocation and
administration. As international agencies like VITA have
begun turning to shuras as implementation partners, these
councils have become dominated by local party
representatives of the mulaheddin.
Once an area was selected for suppport through ASSP,
project requests were expected to originate from within the
shura. By working through the shura, VITA set out to obtain
guarantees that the community would provide twenty to thirty
percent of project cost by supplying local labor to
rehabilitation efforts. In this way, VITA depended upon
beneficiaries to handle distribution and implementation and
to contribute to project costs. Because VITA invests the
shura with responsibility for all aspects of local project
implementation, USAID has no way to determine, however, the
extent to which assistance reaches all members within a
project area.
Since its inception, this project model been replicated
by other agencies. By engaging the local population in some
form of project design, implementation, and monitoring, ASSP
is considered by its planners to provide Afghan residing in
project areas a means to "determine their own destiny," an
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objective frequently voiced among international assistance
professionals working in Pakistan. USAID considers ASSP to
represent an effective approach to regional rehabilitation
for these same reasons. By requiring the general
participation of local beneficiaries in funded projects,
USAID anticipates that these activities represent a viable
approach to the rehabilitation of rural Afghanistan. By
supporting different projects in various parts of the
country, however, USAID's regional rehabilitation is
necessarily inconsistent under conditions of war.
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CHAPTER THREE:
WHAT THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR REFUGEES HAS BEEN DOING
Following the 1988 Geneva Accords, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR) similiarly began
planning cross-border agricultural assistance projects for
Afghanistan. Because UNHCR's mandate is to protect and to
assist refugees outside the border of their homeland,
this cross-border activity represents an unprecedented
undertaking by UNHCR.
Because Afghan refugees represent the largest refugee
population in the world, UNHCR believes that its
reponsibility to this massive population includes
facilitating their return and initial resettlement in
Afghanistan. For UNHCR, cross-border operations in
Afghanistan simply represent an extension of its official
mandate. By providing emergency rehabilitation assistance to
areas to which large numbers of refugees are expected to
return, UNHCR supports cross-border projects as a means to
ensure that this population can return and resume production
in their former homeland once the conflict ends.
Given the mandate of UNHCR to protect refugees, its
34
cross-border assistance program has a different focus than
that of other cross-border programs. Most cross-border
activities, like those supported by USAID, support
populations that have been less affected by the war and have
engaged in sustained agricultural production. These programs
support the continuation of these efforts. By contrast, the
UNHCR program is specifically aimed at rehabilitating areas
from which a substantial proportion of the population has
fled in order to create conducive conditions for their
return. In this 'way, UNHCR promotes projects in areas that
have undergone extreme changes during war.
Project areas that have suffered considerable population
loss tend to have been significantly destroyed. Some remain
under threat of violence. In these areas, the remaining
population cannot fully represent others who have fled. In
some parts, populations fled specifically because the area
came under control of a party or commander who members of
the community rejected. UNHCR projects attempt to restore
the production capacity of project areas to their prewar
levels while engaging populations who do not represent the
the project area's prewar population.
By September 1989, UNHCR had committed a total of
approximately $6 million to support its cross-border
operations. Many UNHCR grants support NGOs funded through
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USAID for other rehabilitation projects. Additionally, UNHCR
provides grants to a number of European NGOs with longer
operational experience in Afghanistan than the U.S.-based
NGOs increasingly supported by USAID. UNHCR has
intentionally structured its funding processes in such a way
that the program may readily expand. Funds are available
equally to NGOs administering projects in Afghanistan and to
NGOs with no working experience in the area, so that newly
arrived NGOs may attempt pilot projects and become familiar
with the operating conditions of the country. Unlike USAID,
which applies its official NGO project approach to the
cross-border operations it funds, UNHCR encourages NGOs to
experiment within Afghanistan in order to find what works.
UNHCR avoids supporting the formation of political
alliances during the course of the rehabilitation process.
The UNHCR 1989 Plan of Action, outlining its part in the
overall assistance strategy for Afghanistan, expressly
states that UNHCR assistance should be implemented by
civilian and non-partisan entities (UNHCR 1989). This
implies that rehabilitation efforts should avoid
strengthening a particular individual or group throughout
the process. By acknowledging that the support of political
leaders can hinder the repatriation process, UNHCR was the
first funding agency to attempt to direct local assistance
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expressly to civilians residing in targeted areas.
This approach has expanded since the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan in February 1989. As the war among Afghans
continued despite the Soviet withdrawal, UNHCR altered its
repatriation plan to allow for the possibility of a more
prolonged process of return by refugees to the rural areas.
In order to strengthen the administrative capacity and self-
reliance of communities receiving rehabilitation assistance,
UNHCR has shifted in its program approach to encourage cost-
sharing in the cross-border projects it funds. Increasingly,
UNHCR requests that its NGO projects require cost-sharing by
project beneficiaries so that, over time, assisted
communities may absorb the total cost of the project and
assume full responsibility for the administration of the
project. Through cost-sharing, UNHCR expects to create
incentives within assisted communities to engage all
residents in the project process.
UNHCR expects that community cost-sharing ensure that all
local residents will participate in funding the project
because communities are unlikely in permit local residents
to benefit from assistance they do not help pay for. In this
way, cost-sharing minimizes the potential for
disproportionate access of resources by members of the
party-dominated shura or local commander. UNHCR also
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anticipates that this project approach will require communal
input and will result in the increasingly equal involvement
in project administration by individuals residing in the
assisted regions. UNHCR increasingly supports project based
on this participatory approach to assistance (UNHCR 1989b).
UNHCR cross-border projects specifically target areas
that have produced the greatest proportion of refugees in
Afghanistan. UNHCR has identified fourteen provinces as
first priority project areas. Ten of these--four provinces
along the Pakistan border, three western provinces and the
three provinces along Afghanistan's border with Iran--have
been identified by UNHCR as having at least 50% their prewar
population currently registered as refugees (see Annex II).
Through June 1989, UNHCR supported twenty-four NGOs with
more than eighty ongoing or pilot projects in fourteen
provinces. Thirty-five percent or more of the original
population of each of these provinces is believed to be
living as refugees in Pakistan or Iran. Together, these
provinces represent the homelands of ninety percent of the
estimated refugee populations settled in Iran or Pakistan.
Areas targeted for priority relief and rehabilitation
include both muiaheddin-controlled areas and zones
controlled by the Kabul government. Because the majority of
refugees originate from rural Afghanistan, which is
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controlled by the resistance, the same degree of support is
not required by UNHCR in the government-controlled urban
areas. UNHCR has, however, provided relief goods to
returnees through UNHCR-sponsored "peace guesthouses," which
were constructed outside the cities of Kabul and Mazar-i-
Sharif expressly to assist urban-rural returnees. Because
UNHCR is required by mandate to assist all war-affected
individuals by working with both parties in the conflict,
UNHCR has the potential to engage both supporters of the
resistance and the Kabul government in its rehabilitation
activities.
In its assistance approach, UNHCR aims to create
conditions conducive to repatriation by supporting projects
that provide immediate relief and basic rehabilitation
assistance to the homelands of potential returnees. As a
result, UNHCR does not support agricultural projects
concerned with long-term rehabilitation, but attempts
instead to support projects that will minimize local
dependency on continued or long-term assistance (English
1989: 29). These projects take the form of emergency
agricultural assistance, involving irrigation repair or the
provision of improved wheat seed, fertilizer and pesticides
to targeted, needy areas. UNHCR also gives preference to
rural works projects that will facilitate the repatriation
process by allowing relief goods to be stored or transported
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in strategic locations. Because the UNHCR cross-border
program explicitly prepares for the return of refugees to
local areas, it creates local awareness of the fact that
supporting refugee return will continue to generate valuable
international assistance.
This summarizes the approaches of USAID and UNHCR, the
largest international agencies supporting cross-border
operations, to rehabilitation inside Afghanistan. Chapter
four considers some of the constraints involved in pursuing
successful and effective rehabilitation projects under
conditions of war.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
WHAT KIND OF CONSTRAINTS INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
FACE IN AFGHANISTAN
Both USAID and UNHCR support programs that utilize
similar resources to attain different objectives. USAID's
program attempts to strengthen the capacity of rural
Afghanistan to govern itself and to administer assistance.
UNHCR, by contrast, has more immediate objectives. UNHCR
assists in the emergency rehabilitation of the regions to
which refugees are most likely to return. Despite their
different agendas, however, both international agencies have
no option but to rely upon NGOs to implement their programs
inside Afghanistan.
Given this essential constraint, the differences between
these agencies are often less apparent in actual field
operations. This reflects the fact that during war outside
agencies cannot entirely determine the direction of
assistance projects, despite their stated goals.
Both USAID and UNHCR work with extremely limited
information to determine what is needed in potential project
areas. Neither agency maintains a staff to conduct pre-
feasibility studies in proposed project areas. Nor does
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either agency fund projects based upon a comprehensive plan
outlining specific rehabilitation objectives. Instead, both
agencies rely upon NGOs to propose projects for potential
assistance. In this way, both USAID and UNHCR have adopted a
largely reactive approach to project funding, deciding upon
the usefulness of projects as they are proposed rather than
establishing specific criteria for NGOs to follow in
designing projects.
The reasons behind this approach are different for both
USAID and UNHCR. USAID originally formulated its NGO
program--PVO Co-Financing and the Rural Assistance Project
(RAP)--expressly to support the work of agencies already
operating inside Afghanistan. Its program continues to
provide largely symbolic support for viable activities
affecting rural Afghanistan. At the same time, USAID does
emphasize to NGOs the importance of institution-building
through funded projects. Responding to the changing needs of
the rural areas, for example, USAID's PVO Co-Financing
Project has recently shifted towards training Afghan health
workers rather than providing emergency medical care. USAID
does not, however, outline specific plans for specific
regions in its rehabilitation program.
By contrast, UNHCR purposely refrains from directing NGOs
in their activities. This agency believes that NGOs can be
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most effective in emergency rehabilitation by operating
independently and experimentally in war-affected regions.
UNHCR, like USAID, essentially follows the lead of NGOs in
its program activities.
Both USAID and UNHCR are constrained by their
conventional approach to grants funding. Despite the
conditions of war, both agencies make grants to NGOs
according to practices employed in funding development
projects. The lack of innovation in funding has
inadvertently provided NGOs substantial control in the
design, implementation, and evaluation of cross-border
rehabilitation. In the grant process, for example, both
agencies rely entirely upon NGOs to determine the
feasibility or usefulness of a proposed rehabilitation
project. This means that the potential grantee is
responsible for providing all information relevant to the
grant. The grant process also requires that NGOs identify
the potential needs of a potential project area at the
beginning of the funding cycle. In this way, each NGO acts
as a watchdog for its own project activities.
The grant process assumes that NGOs can determine the
feasibility of a proposed project before it has received
funding---that is, before it has begun. As a result, NGOs
typically plan local rehabilitation assistance before they
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have gained regular access to the project area. This is not
always the case: some grants support ongoing rehabilitation
assistance. In most cases, however, NGOs receive grants
before they can test the feasibility of a proposed project.
By following conventional funding approaches in exceptional
circumstances, both USAID and UNHCR fail to provide a means
to determine project feasibility through the grant process.
Both USAID and UNHCR encourage NGOs to ensure that local
rehabilitation assistance represents what the residents of a
project area want and need. What this means--and how this is
ensured--is different among the NGOs. USAID promotes working
with a shura, or local council, which can represent a
community in making assistance requests and channel
assistance into the project area. UNHCR encourages funded
NGOs to work with local groups--elders, village maliks,
farmers--that represent project areas in order to determine
local needs. Unlike USAID, UNHCR clearly discourages the
inclusion of political representatives--commanders or local
party leaders--in the assistance process. The extent to
which these specifications are put into practice, however,
is largely left to the NGO.
Some NGOs are successful in Afghanistan precisely because
they do work directly with local political leaders. The
British NGO, Afghanaid, for example, has established a
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considerable agricultural assistance program in the Panjshir
Valley by working directly with a powerful commander, Ahmed
Shah Massoud, who controls a significant part of the
northeastern Afghanistan. This region is administered
through an extensive, party-based council, the Shura-i-
Nazar, which is structured like a governmental organization
and includes representatives from several provinces. Unique
in rural Afghanistan, this shura attests to the
administrative capacity and mediating skills of Massoud. It
also represents a politically-based organization,- however
successful.
Both USAID and UNHCR have supported Afghanaid in its
rehabilitation operations in the Panjshir. Although UNHCR
has expressed reservations over the fact that Afghanaid
transferred implementing responsibility to commanders in its
Panjshir-based projects, this agency continues to contribute
to Afghanaid's rehabilitation efforts in the region (UNHCR
1989b). Based upon monitoring reports by Afghanaid staff,
there is no indication that working with Massoud and the
Jamiat party has adversely affected either distribution or
local representation. By actively avoiding the appearance of
political favoritism, international agencies are limited in
their ability to reach some unusually organized groups in
times of war--those controlled by commanders.
45
Finally, both USAID and UNHCR are constrained in their
ability to effectively evaluate the operations of funded
projects. Because these programs fund a diverse group of
projects administered by a variety of NGOs, evaluation
approaches vary widely. This can be explained by the fact
that NGO monitors are typically local Afghan staff who
rarely have any training or background in project
evaluation. As a result, the agencies funding these projects
are supplied by the NGOs with evaluation reports that lack
any quantitative measure of project progress.
Few assistance professionals travel to project sites for
evaluation for two reasons. Initially, most NGOs favored
sending Afghans into Afghanistan to maintain the indigenous
nature of rehabilitation projects. At the same time, the
U.S. Government has prohibited NGOs receiving U.S. funds
from sending Americans into Afghanistan; given the
significant proportion of U.S.-based NGOs funded by USAID,
this restriction has discouraged U.S. NGOs from anticipating
an active role for its professional staff in evaluation
activities. These constraints have influenced NGO operations
and greatly affected the quality of the evaluations that
USAID and UNHCR have available to them.
Both USAID and UNHCR have contributed to the poor quality
of project evaluation by initially failing to set standards
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for NGOs. To satisfy minimal reporting requirements, many
NGOs engage a small monitoring staff to travel to project
sites and report on the progress of funded projects. Due to
the difficult conditions in Afghanistan, there is frequently
significant delay between the time monitoring reports are
expected by the funding agency and the time they finally
arrive in Peshawar. For this reason, they often become
irrelevant to funding decisions. Neither agency has taken
steps to require an expansion of NGO monitoring staffs or a
restructuring of the monitoring process. At the same time,
neither agency has actively enforced the adoption of a
standard evaluation format that provides some quantifiable
measure of the conditions of project area and the impact of
assistance. By accepting incomplete reporting from project
areas, USAID and UNHCR increase the potential for wasted
resources in project areas.
These are some of the ways in which USAID and UNHCR are
constrained in their approach to rehabilitation inside
Afghanistan. In many cases, the program approach of these
agencies is largely determined by the efforts of NGOs.
Despite the fact that both agencies have slightly different
program objectives in Afghanistan, by working through NGOs
the outcome of their efforts is often quite similar. By
adopting a standard development approach to rehabilitation
programs in Afghanistan, both USAID and UNHCR appear to have
47
become limited in their abilities are set the direction for
rehabilitation inside Afghanistan. This has, in fact, become
the realm of NGOs.
CHAPTER FIVE:
WHY OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE IS PROBLEMATIC
INSIDE AFGHANISTAN
Although both USAID and UNHCR support rehabilitation in
Afghanistan, each agency adheres to a different set of
objectives. The potential implications of these efforts,
however, are very much the same. By supporting projects
during war, each agency is funding projects without the
cooperation of the host government. This is partly what
makes the case of rehabilitation in Afghanistan unique. At
the same time, because these international agencies lack a
government counterpart to administer this assistance, they
rely entirely upon the NGOs they support inside Afghanistan
to design, implement, and evaluate projects that will
influence the rehabilitation process and possibly facilitate
the return of the massive refugee population to the assisted
rural areas. By operating this way, international agencies
risk creating structures and projects that may conflict with
the government potentially controlling rural Afghanistan.
During the rehabilitation process, the approaches and
decisions of these NGOs--many of which are relatively
inexperienced in Afghanistan--can have substantial impact on
project areas. This section examines some of the more
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problematic aspects of the program approaches adopted by
USAID and UNHCR in the operations the support in
Afghanistan.
USAID and UNHCR depend upon the funded NGOs to determine
what kind of rehabilitation assistance is needed in
potential project areas. USAID originally intended to engage
government in these local assessments by coordinating
rehabilitation efforts with the Afghan Interim Government
(AIG), representing the seven-party alliance of the
resistance. However, it abandoned this approach in favor of
regionally-based rehabilitation undertaken by a funded NGO
in consultation with members of a local shura. Working with
shuras that represent a project area during war may
eventually prove to be problematic in rural Afghanistan.
By strengthening the administrative capacity of regions
that have remained productive during war, USAID risks
establishing areas that may ultimately threaten the
authority of the government that eventually controls the
rural areas. By supporting shuras as implementing partners,
USAID specifically risks strengthening the local authority
of the individuals who comprise the shura. In most cases,
decision-making by shuras receiving international assistance
is dominated by local party leaders or commanders (Carter
and Connor 1989: 25). Given this pattern, it seems unlikely
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that local political leaders who have emerged during war
will rescind their authority over local assistance projects
as the war winds down and large-scale rehabilitation begins.
The USAID bias toward relatively strong, productive
regions may build rural zones that are considerably more
developed than other war-affected areas. This could
negatively affect the stability of surrounding areas by
attracting returnees to project areas during repatriation or
strengthening the power base of local political leaders
associated with these assistance efforts. In either case,
these projects are likely to incite conflict in postwar
Afghanistan. Despite the fact that these efforts were
originally intended to bolster the institutional capacity of
rural areas, they may actually threaten local areas as they
begun to re-form during the rehabilitation process.
Rather than engage a government or counterpart in
assessing local needs, UNHCR has attempted to bypass
political structures altogether by working with local, non-
partisan groups instead. UNHCR encourages the NGOs it funds
to identify and support needy local groups in areas heavily
impacted by war. By providing resources to groups that are
not necessarily part of an organized local structure, NGOs
risk strengthening individual groups within war-affected
areas who are not necessarily responsible for representing a
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larger commmunity. Because UNHCR actively encourages the
participation of relatively inexperienced NGOs in these
rehabilitation activities, it is likely that UNHCR-supported
NGOs will be unable to distinguish the most efficient
implementing partners from among potential beneficiaries.
Although UNHCR and USAID encourage NGOs to work with
different kinds of local groups throughout the
rehabilitation process, both agencies have the potential to
incite conflict among those who have direct access to
resources--and those who don't--through the rehabilitation
process.
USAID and UNHCR both rely heavily upon NGOs to provide
information relevant to the grant process. Neither agency,
however, has the capacity to confirm the reliability of
information supplied by the NGOs. To question whether such
information is sound, however, is not necessarily to
question the reliability of the NGOs themselves. In most
cases, Peshawar-based NGOs work with information that comes
to them from Afghan monitoring staff or through visits by
representatives of project beneficiaries inside Afghanistan.
Typically, NGOs only tell to USAID or UNHCR what is told to
them by Afghan contacts.
Some agencies, like International Rescue Committee, work
with Afghans in Pakistan who originate from project areas.
52
These connections provide an important check on information
and the sources behind them. International Rescue Committee,
another of the few agencies funded by both USAID and UNHCR,
represents an agency that supports projects in close
proximity to Pakistan. Its project areas, located across the
border in Paktia Province, permit regular access by Afghan
staff as well as frequent visits by Afghan refugees
administered by International Rescue Committee in refugee
camp projects. Because these projects areas are accessible,
there is a steady flow of information from various sources
regarding the progress of the projects. In its ASSP project,
USAID's contractor, VITA,has adopted a similar practice by
assigning Area District Officers to the assisted areas. By
stationing a project officer in the project area, USAID
permits constant project evaluation and encourages
familiarity to be established by project staff and the local
beneficiaries.
Most NGOs, however, support projects further inside
Afghanistan, which increases the reliance of NGOs on a
limited number of sources. This arrangement can be
problematic because it fails to provide a check on Afghan
project monitors, who are typically untrained in evaluation
and usually lack long-term familiarity with the project
areas. Project reports that only draw upon the skills and
observations of a limited number of monitors can promote
misinformation about projects that cannot be readily
corrected. As a result, employing a conventional approach to
project monitoring in rehabilitation projects can promote
bias and limit the capacity of the funding agency to
critique the quality of the projects it supports.
By working outside the structures of government, both
USAID and UNHCR are directly supporting local areas through
the provision of rehabilitation assistance. In this way,
both agencies are supporting programs that strengthen a
limited number of local groups. What these agencies know
about these groups is necessarily limited by the constraints
of war, which require that agencies work through various
NGOs to support rehabilitation. By strengthening project
beneficiaries, international agencies risk establishing
regions that will be difficult for the eventual government
controlling rural Afghanistan to absorb.
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CHAPTER SIX:
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
ASSISTANCE AT THE END OF A WAR
By supporting projects that are independent of
government, international agencies risk strengthening
project areas that may prove difficult for a central
government to absorb following war--partly as a result of
assistance. In the case of Afghanistan, both USAID and UNHCR
aim to increase self-sufficiency among rural Afghans by
supporting rehabilitation. To reach project areas, however,
both agencies have channeled resources through NGOs, which
depend largely upon political alliances and contacts as a
means of reaching project areas. Rehabilitation efforts,
therefore, are closely linked to the politics and principles
of the project beneficiaries. This section will examine the
potential implications of rehabilitation projects in the
postwar period and will consider whether international
agencies can design projects that will endure after the
resolution of war.
In the case of Afghanistan, it appears that some formal
resolution is possible for this war that has been locked in
a stalemate. According to recent reports, the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia, the countries that have regularly armed and financed
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the military operations of the Afghan resistance, currently
propose that the war be settled through internationally
supervised elections. Afghan guerilla groups, however,
continue to resist this proposal. If the U.S.S.R. should
join these countries in supporting elections to resolve the
national leadership issue, then elections are likely to
occur. In the event that the communist Najibullah regime
retains power through elections, the international agencies
that have supported rehabilitation will be faced with a
dilemma: Should assistance efforts stop, although rural
Afghans are likely to continue resisting control by a
communist regime? Or, should rehabilitation in these project
areas continue, despite the fact that these will appear to
bolster the resistance and extend the conflict, despite the
official resolution of war?
Given the fact that the resistance seems unwilling to
support these elections, it is likely that Afghanistan will
become engaged in a prolonged, regional conflict. In this
scenario, USAID is unlikely to continue its humanitarian
assistance activities to rural Afghanistan at the current
level. Indeed, without the promise of conditions that may
bring about the safe return of Afghan refugees, it is
unlikely that UNHCR will continue supporting emergency
rehabilitation efforts inside the country. In this scenario,
the NGO presence is likely to shift considerably, with only
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the most politically committed groups continuing to operate
with funding from various small donors.
There is a third scenario: these two international
agencies could work cooperatively with the newly elected
government to assist in the rehabilitation of rural
Afghanistan. Afghanistan has a tradition of weak central
government. Following the resolution of war, rural Afghans
are likely to assert their authority over rural territory,
whether as a unified alliance or through isolated skirmishes
in various regions. For USAID, supporting national
rehabilitation would entail decreasing its support of
regional rehabilitation and the strengthening of
institutional bodies at the local level. To cooperate, USAID
would necessarily channel its assistance through the central
government, which would require breaking its ties with
district groups supported through the ASSP area development
scheme, which was itself designed to create a local
implementation capacity to successfully function in the
absence of government. Because USAID has funded these groups
as a counterpoint to government, it is likely that shifting
support to government channels would result in anti-American
sentiment in former project areas.
By contrast, UNHCR is in a better position to continue
working with a central government following war. UNHCR has
57
maintained its neutrality during the course of its cross-
border operations. Indeed, UNHCR has a mandate to cooperate
with both government and the opposition in any area in which
it operates. Because it targets areas to which refugees are
expected to return, UNHCR, however, has undertaken limited
rehabilitation efforts in the government-controlled urban
areas. More importantly, it seems that its projects would be
difficult to transfer to a government authority, because
UNHCR has specifically attempted to engage local civilian
groups in its smaller-scale rehabilitation efforts. In most
cases, transferring UNHCR-sponsored projects to the
government would involve wresting control of privately-run
projects from local beneficiaries. This would create a
volatile situation in the postwar period.
Whichever international agency responds first to the
changing political situation in Afghanistan, the NGOs will
face difficult circumstances in project areas while
responding to these changes. In several cases, USAID and
UNHCR both support the activities of a single NGO operating
in different areas. In most cases, NGOs that implement
multiple activities work with groups that are in some way
connected: activities funded from different sources may take
place within an area controlled by a single commander, for
example, or the project beneficiaries may belong to the same
resistance party. For this reason, NGOs will face--and
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create--local conflicts if they are obligated to withdraw
support for a group of projects in an area in which they
continue to operate with resources from the another agency.
This represents only one way in which the changing policies
of the international agencies USAID and UNHCR may lead to
conflicts involving NGOs at the field level.
Although USAID and UNHCR adhere to different sets of
objectives, the changing political situation in Afghanistan
will bring to the surface many of the same constraints they
face. Cooperating with an internationally-recognized
government in undertaking rehabilitation will necessarily
require disrupting rehabilitation activities that have
already been established. Because the projects supported by
NGOs through either UNHCR or USAID largely depend upon
political alliances and contacts, it is less likely that the
efforts of either of these agencies can be sustained or
supported during the postwar period. Because these projects
have been established under serious constraints, it appears
that neither agency had other options available when
designing its rehabilitation programs for rural Afghanistan.
As a result, it seems that it will be impossible to build
upon these efforts and incorporate them into a central
government program after the war. These localized efforts
will most likely remain a phenomenon of war, isolated from
rehabilitation that takes place in conditions of peace.
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